

Khrushchev's Revelations about Stalin's Regime

THE
ANATOMY
OF
TERROR



INTRODUCTION BY NATHANIEL WEYL

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The text of the speech delivered by Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia, at the party's Twentieth Congress on February 24 and 25, 1956, appears herein on pages 19 - 73 as released by the U.S. Department of State on June 4, 1956.

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INTRODUCTION

Khrushchev's speech is one of the most remarkable documents of our generation. It may mark the most important turning point in the dynamics of Soviet Communism since Lenin's death. Although there are instances of usurpers who have attacked the regimes from which they wrested power in terms equally savage and unrelenting, there is no case to my knowledge in which a government delivered an arraignment as devastating as this against its predecessor at the cost of thereby impairing its own claim to legitimacy.

The impact of the destruction of the Stalin myth on the Soviet population and on the foreign Communist parties is only beginning to be felt. As William Benton summarized it in a recent issue of the *New York Times*:

"The anti-Stalin campaign is shaking Russia psychologically in a way it has not been shaken in the thirty-eight years of the Soviet regime. For decades, the people of the U.S.S.R. were told that Stalin was the wisest, the kindest, the sweetest, the greatest man who ever lived; in a word, that he was infallible. Ever since World War II that theme has been hammered into the captive peoples of East Europe. Now the word is that he was a maniac. He was also a murderer and a monster. His victims are being released from jail, or posthumously 'rehabilitated.' The books, movies, plays, poems and pictures produced during his lifetime must now be scrapped. Yesterday's white is today's black."

The Kremlin's decision to turn on Stalin publicly and shatter his reputation was one of the utmost gravity which was almost certainly not made in haste. Its disadvantages and potential dangers must have been self-evident. Stalin could not be demolished without calling into question all those policies and institutions which the dead dictator had established and to which his living successors had been party. This would inevitably, sooner or later, open the door to far freer criticism of policy by the 900 million subjects of Communism. A foreseeable result would be to stimulate attitudes of skepticism and cynicism among Communists in all countries toward their Russian leadership. Opposition might develop within the Communist parties either with the ostensible purpose of defending Stalin's memory, as in Georgia, or, alternately, to displace the present Soviet leadership as one irremediably soiled by its Stalinist past. The denunciation of Stalin certainly gave considerable ammunition to the free

world. It made it possible for the Voice of America to broadcast to the entire world the atrocities and record of misrule of the Soviet government over a period of 20 years, citing Khrushchev as source.

Khrushchev's iconoclastic attack conceded by implication that Soviet Communism is the sort of governmental system in which a single individual can seize supreme power, can pervert the police and judiciary to eliminate the most trusted officials on trumped-up charges of espionage and treason, and can stagger from one blunder to the next while the entire machinery of the party and the state hails him as a genius. Whatever checks and balances the Soviet system possessed were shown to be totally inadequate to prevent the transformation of party dictatorship into the absolute dictatorship of one man.

The Soviet leaders must have foreseen many of the dangerous consequences that would inevitably flow from their decision to explode the Stalin legend. Yet they took that decision. Plainly momentous matters were at stake. American opinion sensed this and the reaction was immediate, widespread and varied.

AMERICAN REACTIONS

Although cautious, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that fundamental changes were occurring in the Soviet system. In a major foreign policy address delivered on February 26th, immediately after the close of the 20th Communist Party Congress, Dulles drew attention to the fact that the rulers of Russia were "busy revising the Soviet communist creed. . . There has been a notable shift in Soviet foreign policy," the reason for the change being that the old policies had been "thwarted by the free world." Commenting further on the Kremlin's relinquishment of the dogma that the Communist forces can come to power only by violent revolution, Dulles added: "Until recently, the foreign policy of Soviet Communism was based on fanatical intolerance of all other systems and upon the organization of violence to overthrow all other systems." Dulles appraised these changes in the Soviet Union as follows:

" . . . We well knew that under Leninism any tactic is admissible and that the change had come about, not through change of heart, but because old methods had failed.

"On the other hand, we knew that the new Soviet tactics of increased tolerance and less dependence upon violence required a basic change in Soviet Communist doctrine. This can, in the long run, have major internal consequences and set up within Russia powerful liberalizing trends.

"But the fanatical teaching of a generation cannot be erased all at once. Also the change had not gone so far that there could not be a sudden reversal to the old practices of intolerance and violence. . .

"But, on the other hand, we do not assume fatalistically that there can be no evolution within Russia or that Russia's rulers will always be predatory. Some day Russia will be governed by men who put the welfare of the Russian people above world conquest. It is our basic policy to seek to advance the coming of that day.

"So, last spring, when Soviet conduct began to change, we determined to do all that we safely could to make that change a first installment toward an eventual Russian state that would be a normal, not abnormal, member of the society of nations."

As expressed by Dulles, the official position of the United States Government is that Soviet denunciation of much of the past "gives cause for hope . . . for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed."

Some high American officials are less sanguine. Thus in a speech delivered on June 7th, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, while recognizing the importance of the Soviet "new look" in the war for men's minds, stated: "In the cold light of history it seems fantastic that a nation with the Soviet record of terror and aggression could hope to make widespread gains by announcing a simple change of policy."

For the most part, the editorial reaction to the Khrushchev speech concentrated on the fact that the Soviet system is and remains dictatorial and that Khrushchev cannot exculpate himself entirely from Stalin's crimes.

Editorially the *New York Times* stated: "The prime factor which made possible Stalin's crimes, those acknowledged and those still unavowed, was the dictatorial nature of the Soviet state and the ideological nature of that state's goals. It is the essential characteristic of a dictatorship that one man or a group of men have the power to impose their will upon a people, regardless of a people's will. This is as true of a collective dictatorship as of the one-man variety." The *New York Herald-Tribune* echoed this idea: "The plain fact is that the system spawned Stalin and the only change now is the transfer of power from one man to a very few."

The leading syndicated commentators tended to judge the Khrushchev speech in historical, rather than in moral terms. "My notion," Walter Lippmann wrote, "is that the Stalinist terror, allowing for Stalin's personal abnormalities, was an integral part of the violent and abnormal revolutionary transformation of Russia which began in 1928. The question then would be whether the Soviet system has now reached an equilibrium where it can be operated without the terror."

Joseph and Stewart Alsop answered the question Lippmann raised:

"For the people of the Soviet Union, this new tincture of humanity

among their rulers no doubt promises somewhat better days. The terror is over. It is not likely to be reinaugurated either, although the instruments of terror still persist, because the great postwar rise of Soviet national income has now given the Soviet peoples a standard of living high enough so terror is needless."

There are many Americans who believe that despite recent events in Russia fundamentally nothing has changed, or can be expected to change, in the aims or structure of Soviet Communism. There are some who contend that the Khrushchev speech is part of a tactical maneuver designed to lull the United States to sleep and encompass its destruction. Perhaps the most exhaustive statement of this attitude is a symposium on the Russian new look released by the House Un-American Activities Committee on May 19 under the title *The Great Pretense*. Of some forty articles in the symposium that of Whittaker Chambers is outstanding; his concluding paragraphs present this viewpoint admirably and are worth quoting *in extenso*:

"Stalin and Stalinism were morally outrageous. But that does not explain why they came to power. Nor is there space here to explain why I believe they came to power. Here I can only say: a specific set of historical factors made them possible because, to Communism, they were useful. I can only add: in my opinion, a different set of historical factors now makes them unfeasible because they have become an impediment to the advance of Communism. In short, Stalin and Stalinism have outlived their usefulness to Communism. That is why the Kremlin is dumping them. But since Stalinism was morally outrageous, its liquidation has on Communism (and on millions who are not Communist) the buoyant effect of a successful surgical operation. That is not the only effect of the operation. Its purpose, if I see it rightly, is to convince that same 'enlightened' opinion of the West that Communism is now something that any decent soul can coexist with, trade with, make friends with. It may take a little time, but the harvest, judging by the past, may be a fat one. It may soon follow that those who do not believe that Communism has changed will find that they are the 'indecent souls.' Communism, in the name of decency and reason, will be rallying 'enlightened' opinion in the West precisely against those 'indecent souls.' The action will take the form of popular fronts and a much vaster climate of good will. Need I point out that the 'unenlightened,' the 'indecent,' the men of 'ill will' will then be those who distrust Communism, fight it, insist that, while it often changes its masks, it has never been known to change its inherent character?

"In brief, Communism's great change, dating from the 20th Congress,

is a change of tactics, not of intentions. Communism is cleaning house in order to make its personnel, its formations, its tactics, more acceptable, efficient, up to date, and thus to hasten its project of dividing, wooing, and winning the West, preparatory to overrunning the West. That Communist purpose never changes. No doubt, the swing in the Communist line is much complicated by inner-Communist and inner-Soviet factors which I have not touched on. No doubt, the Communist leaders are playing with forces that might, conceivably, get out of hand. Therefore, the question of the moment is: Will the surgical operation on Stalinism be successful? I believe it will. But nobody knows. Everybody is waiting to see. If it is successful Communism will be a greater threat to the West than ever."

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

There is a general consensus that the Khrushchev speech was designed to aid the Soviet Union in a major reorientation of foreign policy. As Vice President Nixon phrased it: "The leaders of the Soviet Union invited the rest of the world to a period of peaceful coexistence."

The new Soviet rulers claim to agree with the United States that all wars involve the risk of human extinction and hence that war as an instrument of national policy should be renounced. They contend they have used their influence to settle the civil war in Indochina by negotiation, to bring about the withdrawal of the Communist invaders of Laos, and to induce Red China to put aside its preparations for the seizure of Quemoy and Matsu. More recently, Khrushchev has criticized Stalin for his reckless decision to invade South Korea.

This peace drive has been coupled with what appears to be a more tolerant attitude toward the independence of smaller nations. Summarizing these developments, Secretary of State Dulles recently pointed out: "In May of 1955, the Soviet rulers signed the Austrian State Treaty; they made their pilgrimage of repentance to Tito; they offered to establish diplomatic relations with Germany and to make a belated peace with Japan. In Asia, the Bandung Conference gave at least lip service to the idea of negotiation rather than outright violence."

These new approaches have been used by Soviet Communism in competing with the free world for leadership of the 600 million subjects of neutral nations, largely Asians and Africans who are proud of their newly won national freedom. Since the broad appeal of a program for peace, disarmament and the mutual abandonment of military alliance is also having some effect in Western Europe, the danger of united fronts between Communists, Socialists and leftist liberals throughout much of this area is increasing.

To all indications, the Soviet effort to bring about long-range cooperation and perhaps eventual fusion with European social-democracy looks to the establishment of viable coalitions able to form governments in several Western European countries and hence to the disruption of NATO from within. This would hardly be to the advantage of the democracies.

THE SOCIALISTS AND STALIN

The Russian desire to break down the barriers between the Soviet power system and the European Socialists is probably a major factor behind Khrushchev's speech.

To the world Socialist movement, Stalinism is synonymous with perfidy, despotism and murder. In Germany in 1932, Stalin ordered the Communists to concentrate on smashing the Social Democratic Party as the main enemy and thus eased Hitler's road to power. During and after World War II, wherever the Soviets seized power, they destroyed the Socialist organizations and killed or imprisoned those Socialist leaders who showed independence. The record of broken Communist promises and perfidies in their dealings with the Socialists is too long even to be sketched here.

Several American experts on Soviet affairs have suggested that there is basically nothing new in the present policy, that it is merely the popular front strategy of the thirties in modern dress. However, closer examination reveals that the differences are at least as significant as the similarities.

The popular front was a short-range Soviet strategy to turn the West against the Nazis and thus prevent the military isolation of the U.S.S.R. Stalin took no fundamental steps to give the popular front alliances a permanent foundation. While the Communist parties talked democracy, blood purges raged in Russia, forced labor camps were expanded many-fold, and the penal code was made more savage—in short, every despotic aspect of the Soviet system was allowed to burgeon in full view of the world. If the Soviets gave substantial aid to the Spanish Loyalist cause, they also exported a secret police apparatus which systematically murdered anti-Communist elements in the Loyalist coalition. If Russia offered asylum after the defeat in Spain to handpicked Loyalist leaders, most of those who accepted fell victim to the blood purges.

The attraction of the popular front strategy to European Socialism and liberal leftism in the thirties was not the Soviet tyranny, but the belief that unity in the face of the Nazi menace was a necessity of survival. Today, by contrast, the two poles of power between which the Socialists oscillate are the Soviet system and the free world alliance. Consequently,

the Kremlin cannot draw the middle-of-the-road groups into its orbit merely by warning of an alleged danger that civilization faces destruction by supposed reactionary forces. It is evidently being compelled to make changes in the real conditions of Soviet society which would make the latter more palatable to the European Socialist and leftist movements. Consequently, the police-state aspects of the Soviet power are being modified, greater freedom of criticism is being permitted, and, threats of violence and extermination of dissidents are being expunged from the Soviet vocabulary. The proclaimed goals today are, not a world Communist tyranny, but rather "peace", "disarmament" and "amity" among nations. The alliances now being brought into being are not the old monolithic ones in which the Kremlin either ruled or wrecked, but loose associations of groups and nations which differ on many basic issues.

The most fundamental cleavages between the Soviet system and that of Anglo-Saxon democracy may appear less meaningful to the European Socialist movements. Concepts such as class struggle and class justice, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the ethics of revolutionary expediency derive after all from the common fount of Marxism. Nor is the Soviet policy of aiding terrorists in places like Algeria basically at variance with the doctrinaire Socialist attitude toward "colonialism" and "imperialism." In fact, while the slogan in contemporary Russia is "Back to Lenin", the reorganization now occurring in the Soviet world may prove to have more in common with Kautsky's Socialism than with Lenin's Communism.

IMPACT ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Americans are divided as to whether the changes in Soviet policy highlighted by Khrushchev offer us primarily hope for peace or fear of impending subversion and destruction. The pessimistic approach is exemplified in the following statement by Francis J. McNamara, one of the leading officials of the Veterans of Foreign Wars:

"The United States faces a particularly dangerous period, one in which revolution and violence will continue, but one in which purely military force will not have its former effectiveness. The Communists intend to make this a period in which the most important weapons will be the ones they know how best to use—internal subversion, deceitful diplomacy, and political and ideological warfare. On both the national and international fronts, there will be stepped-up pressure to soften up on Communism. The United States Government will be increasingly criticized by its allies and groups of its own citizens for being too rigid and unyielding in matters relating to the Kremlin and its Communist fifth column in the United

States. The anti-Communist fiber of the American people and their leaders will be more severely tested than ever before."

In this and similar statements the position seems to be advanced that any improvement in Soviet conduct is a cause for alarm because it wins friends for the Kremlin. This, of course, raises the question whether the cold war is the end of American foreign policy or merely a means, reluctantly initiated under great provocation, which we desire to abandon as soon as the foundation for a durable and decent peace can be established.

This fundamental issue was raised in penetrating fashion by Secretary Dulles during his April 24th press conference. Replying to a charge by Adlai Stevenson and others that the United States was losing the cold war, Mr. Dulles said: "If by cold war you mean merely to keep alive hatred of Russia, or to keep the Russians permanently ostracized, and to deny them any access to the free world, then I suppose it could be judged that we are not winning." In the corrected transcript, Dulles added this more positive statement: ". . . if, in fact, the Soviet Union is not as much to be feared as it was, if it has become more tolerant, if it has put aside the use of violence, if it is beginning to move in a liberal way within, then I would call that progress toward victory in the cold war."

Those who deny the possibility of basic change in the Soviet Union short of the overthrow of its government by violence take the position that every reform that occurs in the Soviet world is a danger and that every elimination of an evil or moral enormity afflicting the subjects of Communist dictatorship is a defeat for the United States to the extent that it makes it more difficult for this country to contain the Soviet Union and surround it with a cordon of defensive military alliances. By this reasoning, the supreme disaster to the free world would be a Soviet decision to become a law-abiding member of the community of nations.

Thus temporary implements of American foreign policy, such as containment, military preparedness, a system of alliances, etc., are confused with its ends. The exponents of this logic forget that the permanent American goal is a durable peace and world order within which mankind can move toward greater freedom and material well-being. It is entirely possible that this goal will be attained more readily by encouraging those transformations within the Soviet empire which tend in a liberal direction than by attempting to continue policies of uncompromising antagonism.

Among the immediate dangers to the United States, according to McNamara and others, are isolation from its allies. But this isolation will admittedly only occur if no changes are made in American foreign

policy. The cause of the isolation in short would be a failure to react intelligently to a new challenge. Those who are most vocal in warning that the United States may find itself in a minority group in the United Nations are paradoxically the same people who urge precisely that ossification of American foreign policy which could alone make this conjectured and as yet hypothetical danger a reality. Somewhere in his great work *The Life of Reason*, the late George Santayana said that "a fanatic redoubles his efforts when he has forgotten his ends."

We are engaged in a struggle for men's minds and allegiance. In this struggle, the United States and its free-world allies have far more to offer than the Soviet system. The decisive ingredient is that vast complex of values which clusters around the word "freedom." As John Milton wrote in *Areopagitical*: "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"

An American defeat in this struggle could only occur if we were foolish enough to forget the principles that brought the United States into being and made it "man's best hope." To regard the cold war itself as the objective of American foreign policy, to imagine that intransigence toward the Soviet Union is a virtue regardless of circumstances is a sure recipe for making American policy seem sterile, reactionary and obsessed with military force to those European and Asian liberals who not only are spiritually close to us, but who also wield the balance of power. If the Soviet trend toward internal reform and mildness abroad continues, an intransigent policy by the United States will alienate the Socialists, the liberals in the West and the nationalists in the underdeveloped areas. The United States might then be compelled to rely on fascist states and small Asiatic countries under repressive governments to support its policies. In short, the foreseeable end-result would be isolation of the United States and destruction of American world leadership.

The United States Government has shown no signs of any intention of falling into this trap. The Khrushchev speech has already catalyzed significant changes in foreign policy emphasis and approach. The emphasis on defensive military alliances has been softened. A broad survey of NATO has been inaugurated to see whether it can assume major political and economic functions. In a recent speech President Eisenhower spoke about the neutral nations with sympathy and understanding, reminding his audience that the United States in its formative years had retained

its freedom by fighting for the right to be neutral in the struggle between Napoleon and England.

Prophets of Soviet triumph and American doom who show their faith in man's desire for freedom by speaking of the free world as the losing side have thus far been confounded by the initiative and elasticity which American foreign policy is displaying in a period of both crisis and opportunity.

THE DEPTH OF THE TRANSFORMATION

Few Americans entertain any illusions that the Soviet leaders have abandoned Communism or intend to abandon it. Khrushchev's promise that those who wait for the event will have to wait until "shrimps learn how to whistle" is certainly a clearcut statement of what he really thinks.

If no abandonment of Communism is in the cards, what concretely can be hoped in the near future from what Dulles calls "the yeast of change?"

There is as yet little evidence that the Communist Party will surrender its monopolistic position of power or that the Soviet electorate is to be given a free choice between candidates with different platforms. It is not likely that the legislative organs of the Soviet power will change radically from their present position as ornamental gatherings and rubber stamps. In short, political democracy in any recognizable shape would seem a rather improbable development within the foreseeable future of the Soviet system.

The most realistic expectation of change would be from the messianic totalitarian state of Lenin and Stalin to what might perhaps be termed an authoritarian welfare regime in which technicians and managers wield increasingly large powers. In this transformation, the most important major reform which might occur would be the substitution of due process of law for arbitrary violence in the penal code. This does not, of course, mean a Soviet reform comparable to the safeguards enjoyed in Anglo-Saxon countries. The precise definition of crimes and their punishment, a definition of the rights of the accused and of the minimum characteristics of a fair trial would in itself be an enormous step forward. The Soviet announcement that the penal code is being revised would indicate a trend in this direction. Under present conditions of stability, the shift from the secret police to the judicial tribunal does not endanger the Soviet system and does contribute to the well-being and security of the new elite.

A second basic intra-Soviet development which is part of the revisionist policy can best be described as an alleviation of essentially arbitrary pressures. In economic administration, the key word is decentralization.

As far as the intellectual life of the nation is concerned, the major changes are a broadening of horizons: the recognition of foreign scientists and writers, the resurrection of anti-revolutionary writers such as Dostoevsky, the encouragement of novels which deal with the emotional life of men and women, etc. These changes, however, are thus far part of what might be termed the *largesse* of the regime: no one enjoys these advantages as a right; they are the result of decisions by the leadership which can be revoked at its discretion. Behind this entire discussion lies the much larger problem of the extent to which any freedom for the individual can be maintained or guaranteed in a society where the monopoly of economic power approaches the absolute.

REVOLUTIONARIES VS. MANAGERS

Few men did more to perpetuate their own myth than Stalin. He assassinated almost every Communist who had played a role of consequence under Lenin; in fact, he killed more Communists than any other political leader under the sun, Hitler not excepted. He created the institution of the permanent terror. He not only rewrote history, but refashioned the record of the past by destroying all evidence incompatible with his conception of himself as hero.

Yet no sooner was the tyrant dead than his henchmen—people whom he must at the very least have distrusted less than the myriads of others whom he had jailed and killed—began to destroy his work, to release thousands of political victims from the Siberian prison camps, to recodify the penal laws, to bring at least a breath of truth and freer criticism into the varied aspects of Soviet life. After two years of these slow, tentative, cautious innovations, after the new leadership was internally consolidated and secure abroad, it proceeded to activate the Communist Party cadres in the work of demolishing the Stalin legend.

Why did the Stalin myth begin to disintegrate at the moment of Stalin's death? The fundamental reason would seem to be that the impersonal forces of economic and social development within the Soviet Union were working at cross-currents to Stalin's dementia. The forced-draft industrialization which Stalin imposed on the Soviet Union in the thirties by means of massive terror laid the foundations for the ramified Soviet industry of the fifties. This very process of accelerated industrialization brought to the fore a new Soviet managerial and scientific elite which may ultimately prove to be the nemesis of the professional revolutionaries.

The new elite comprises the victors in a ruthless, competitive struggle. After talking to dozens of Soviet leaders at length, William Benton characterized them as "competent, but vital, relaxed, confident of themselves and of their objectives."

The technological and managerial elite is an international phenomenon with certain common traits just as the professional soldier, regardless of nationality, has certain common traits. It deals habitually with facts. It relies either on scientific method or on pragmatic tests. It demands freedom to learn what it needs to know and to say what it thinks. It is at odds with the police state to the extent that the latter destroys individual security and hence individual initiative, suffocates science where it contradicts dogma and suppresses that freedom of thought and communication which is a necessary concomitant of scientific and technological progress.

"On Marxian principles," Professor Arnold J. Toynbee wrote, "we must expect that, if a Russian peasant is taught to live the life of an American mechanic, he will learn to think as the mechanic thinks, to feel as he feels and to desire as he desires. In this tug of war which we are witnessing in Russia between the ideas of Lenin and the methods of Ford, we may look forward to seeing the ascendancy of the Western over the Russian civilization paradoxically confirmed." Although this statement reflects a misunderstanding and oversimplification of Marxism, its conclusion is probably correct. In broader terms, it is conceivable that the Marxist idolatry of material progress and advanced technology will in the end create a society in which the dominant groups think scientifically and demand freedom of inquiry. This may in the long run destroy not only the institutions which the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries created to control the state, but the sacrosanct official philosophy of dialectical materialism as well.

"NOTHING BASIC HAS CHANGED"

Despite some vociferous protests to the contrary, Communism is subject to the same laws that affect all other ideologies and religions which survive long enough to be exposed to changing social environments and challenges. All such movements have changed historically and the changes have been not only superficial, but basic. Buddhism started as a religion without a priesthood, without miracles, without faith in asceticism, without belief in a life hereafter. However, when it became a mass religion, its doctrines were changed to meet new circumstances. It found holy men to venerate, performed miracles and feats of ascetic self-denial, developed an intricate priestly organization and gave its adherents precise blueprints of the worlds beyond the grave.

A more pertinent analogy, one which Arnold J. Toynbee has applied to the Soviet case, is that of the rise and stabilization of Islam. As is well known, the messianic drive of Islam for world conquest was badly shaken by the military defeat suffered by the Crescent at Tours in 732 A.D. There-

after, with certain exceptions, Islam recognized the political organizations of the unbelievers and had normal diplomatic relations with them. Yet the *Koran* did not reflect this changed situation in which Muslim aggression had ceased to be either profitable or feasible. The pedantic student of Islam could point to the holy book and assert that it recognizes no relationship between the Muslim world and world of the Unbelievers except that of war. Hence, he might add, a state of war still exists and the twelve hundred years experience between Tours and today can be dismissed as a mere strategic maneuver to lull the non-Muslims to sleep.

The illusion that Soviet aims never change derives from the Communist mythology of omnipotence. For Communists assume that the basic developments within their orbit are the result of the application of Marxism-Leninism to a changing society by a so-called political general staff of the revolution. They refuse to admit that with time the composition, ideas and values of this "general staff" will be transformed by its environment and that it will tacitly or openly adulterate Marxism-Leninism as other creeds and ideologies have historically been adulterated.

We do not have to swallow these particular Marxist illusions. The Soviet leaders are not supermen who are unaffected by history. They are both shapers of the social order and shaped by it. The illusion of immutability at the core of Marxism-Leninism is entirely untenable.

As a matter of fact, the actual succession of the Soviet leadership illustrates these processes abundantly.

Stalin's formative years were spent as a professional revolutionary and conspirator. Regardless of whether or not he was a Czarist spy, his character was shaped in a school of violence, conspiracy and deceit. He was drawn irresistibly into a movement which appealed to those psychically in rebellion against authority. When a rebel of this sort, a man utterly lacking in the philosophical background of a Lenin or Trotsky, inherited a state, the traits of the conspirator, the hate-drenched rebel, the plotter and practitioner of deceit clashed with the requirements of the tasks of government. In part, the result of this clash was the monstrous and obscene caricature of any social order known as Stalinism.

The men who succeeded Stalin are Bolsheviks of Civil War vintage. In their formative years, they gave their allegiance to a revolutionary state which was fighting for its life in a civil conflict of unspeakable barbarity. These men now in their sixties—Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich—were formed as revolutionaries, but not necessarily as conspirators. Their adult life has been spent as servants of a totalitarian state.

If the first basic shift has been from the conspirator to the open revolu-

tionary in the service of a partisan army, the next transition will be to men of Malenkov's generation, now in their forties and fifties, who are products of a still later stage of Soviet development. From an actuarial standpoint, the Soviet future belongs to a generation of bureaucrats whose adult life has been chiefly devoted to serving the state.

Given quiet times, the logic of evolving Soviet conditions may eventually shape a Soviet mind which has no more interest in world revolution than the modern Christian has in the Apocalyptic Beast. When the younger generation reaches the stratosphere of Soviet power, it is entirely possible that it will continue to mouth the old slogans while pursuing contrary policies. For, as Reinhold Niebuhr says, "historical analogies suggest that the dogmas will be preserved for a long time after the fanatical fury of the dogmatism has disappeared."

THE GUILT OF THE LEADERSHIP

We know something of the atmosphere in which Khrushchev's speech was delivered. Sixteen hundred delegates to the Party Congress met behind locked doors. Not even foreign Communist fraternal delegates were permitted inside. The address lasted until four in the morning. Khrushchev reportedly broke down in tears four times; some thirty delegates fainted or had seizures.

This was not a cold, Machiavellian performance, but an intensely emotional and disturbing ritual in which men who had lived in fear, under terror, in a miasma of lies spoke out to an audience which was also partly guilty. This is plain from the attitude of the listeners, from the question blurted out to Khrushchev (and significantly censored from the version we have): "Why didn't you kill him?"

To a greater or lesser extent, the speaker, the men on the presidium and many in the audience had followed Stalin, had adulated him, had perhaps applauded his crimes, had perhaps demanded the death penalty for men whom they may have suspected were innocent. When they learned what sort of a man Stalin had actually been, when they were told about crimes which they had perhaps previously heard rumors of, but had tried to deny even in the privacy of their own thoughts, clearly they could not dissociate themselves emotionally or morally as if they had been mere bystanders and not participants and accomplices.

In short, there was a factor of guilt at work common to the speaker and his audience. The seance served the purpose of expiation and moral purge for it was necessary to the new regime that the Party recapture the morale it had had under Lenin. In this sense, Stalin may have been used as a scapegoat, but certainly not as an innocent one.

On the factual question of the extent of Khrushchev's complicity in Stalin's crimes, there is considerable variation of opinion. The veteran expert on Soviet affairs, Max Eastman, writes that the present Soviet leaders are "ordinary gangsters" who carried out Stalin's "brutish, stupid and, as they now confess, insane behests."

A different view is advanced by Yuri Rastvorov, the former Red Army lieutenant-colonel who defected to the United States in 1954 while chief of Soviet secret police in Japan. "I do not believe that the present Kremlin leaders had any role in Stalin's death," Rastvorov writes. "Although it would be a mistake to assume that they had been entirely deceived, I believe that with very few exceptions, Stalin's associates and members of the central committee were unaware of the endless purges and criminal acts. In addition, being a master of intrigue, Stalin established a fantastic apparatus of counterintelligence organizations which made it virtually impossible to undertake any practical steps against him. Lastly, toward the end of his life, Stalin surrounded himself with fawning, trusted individuals, among whom he sowed the seeds of insecurity and suspicion, so that they dared not organize any opposition." Whether Rastvorov's statement of the facts is accurate or not is of secondary importance. The new Soviet leadership is not likely to be overthrown simply because its members have bloody hands, since the Communist Party, which would have to take part in the overthrowing, also has bloody hands.

The central issue is not whether Khrushchev stays or is superseded, but the act of iconoclasm itself. This has a momentum of its own and defines a direction in policy.

On the overt plane, the momentum of the denunciation is revealed in a reputed decision to try Stalin posthumously for genocide and other crimes. In its inner aspects, the destruction of Stalin as an authority will stimulate critical examination among the Soviet intellectuals of virtually every aspect of his thirty-year reign. It is very doubtful to this writer that Khrushchev will succeed in maintaining the demarcation line between Leninism and Stalinism or between the "good" Stalin of the collectivization famines and deportations and the "bad" Stalin of the purges of Communist Party personnel. The destruction of a god and his transformation into a devil discharges very powerful emotional reactions. If even a fraction of the energy formerly devoted to the adulation of Stalin is turned actively against him, the ambivalent judgment of Khrushchev will no doubt eventually be swept aside in favor of an even more fundamental repudiation.

SAFEGUARDS FOR THE FUTURE

One of the more amazing features of Khrushchev's speech is his pro-

posals to prevent the recurrence of the reign of terror through which Russia has so recently passed. "The cult of the individual," he declares, must be eradicated in the Communist Party. The Party must return to the Leninist principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism. The Central Committee must keep every organ of the Party under scrutiny to see that it lives up to the new standards of conduct. The Party should eliminate "widely erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual" from the liberal arts and social sciences—in other words, it should engage in wholesale rewriting so that the Soviet citizens will learn the new line and nothing else. Evidently new textbooks are to be issued to replace the Stalinist ones. Individuals who abuse their powers will be chastised and "the evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality" will be corrected.

For the present, it seems, the only safeguards against the emergence of a new Stalin are the expressed intentions of the leadership and the supposed independence of Communist cadres. Without an independent judiciary, without real freedom to criticize, without free elections, without a multi-party system, without a legislature independent of the executive and, above all, without some dispersion of economic power that could form a foundation for a dispersion of political power—without any of this, the Soviet checks against the return of individual absolute dictatorship are sadly inadequate.

The changes made since Stalin's death are heartening and, considering the power of the Bolshevik myth and the shadow cast by Stalinism, they have occurred at a pace which is faster than could have been expected. But the reforms made and in process are only a fraction of what would be necessary to bring Russia into a full-fledged partnership with the free societies of the West.

As the *New York Times* editorialized the day after the publication of Khrushchev's speech:

"Communists traditionally ridicule what they call 'bourgeois democracy.' Yet the clearest moral of Khrushchev's speech is that only under the concept of democracy can there be genuine protection of the rights and interests of the individual. The moment society falls under the rule of those who believe that they alone have the truth, and that therefore they have the right to silence and murder dissidents, then begins the corruption which makes a Stalin possible. Khrushchev's failure to recognize this truth is his basic error, and the worst omen for the Soviet future."

NATHANIEL WEYL

DRAMATIS PERSONAE: THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF PERSONS MENTIONED IN KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH

- Abakumov, Victor S., former head of the Soviet secret police executed in 1954 as a Beria accomplice. He was charged with having fabricated the so-called Leningrad Case, as a result of which several Communist party leaders were executed.
- Andreyev, Andrei A., former Communist party leader and Politburo member whom Stalin removed from that body in 1952.
- Bagramyan, Marshal Ivan K., Soviet World War II commander now believed to be a Deputy Minister of Defense.
- Baturina, purge victim of Beria, otherwise unidentified.
- Beriya, Lavrenti P., former head of the Soviet secret police and a Soviet First Deputy Premier immediately after Stalin's death. Arrested on charges of treason in June, 1953, and executed after a secret trial in December, 1953.
- Bloss, Wilhelm, German political worker of the nineteenth century who received a letter from Marx that Mr. Khrushchev quotes in speech.
- Bukharin, Nikolai I., former outstanding Soviet theoretician and a leader of the right-wing among Soviet Communists in the 1920's. Tried on charges of treason in the 1938 purge trial and subsequently executed.
- Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai A., Premier of the Soviet Union and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party.
- Chubar, Vlas B., Soviet Communist leader who was elected to Politburo in 1935 and disappeared in 1938, a victim of the purges.
- Chudov, member of the 1937 Leningrad anti-Soviet center, otherwise unidentified.
- Denikin, Lieut. Gen. Anton I., one of the chief leaders of the anti-Soviet military forces during the Civil War that followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
- Dzerzhinsky, Felix E., leader of the Soviet secret police who directed the terror campaign against anti-Communists after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
- Eikhe, Robert I., former Communist party leader and alternate Politburo member who was arrested in 1938 and executed in 1940.
- Golubiev, victim of a Beria purge, otherwise unidentified.
- Gorbатов, Col. Gen. Alexander V., World War II Soviet military commander. Now commander of the Baltic Military District and an alternate member of the Communist party Central Committee.
- Ignatiev, Semyon D., head of the Ministry of State Security, or secret police, in early 1953 when the fabricated "doctors' plot" was announced. Removed as national party secretary when the fabrication was exposed, but now party secretary in the Bashkir Republic.
- Kabakov, former party head in Sverdlovsk province who was purged in late 1930's.
- Kaganovich, Lazar M., one of Stalin's oldest associates and supporters. First Deputy Premier and member of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist party.
- Kamenev, Lev B., one of the most prominent Soviet leaders in the early 1920's. At one time Lenin's deputy and head of the Moscow Soviet. Tried and executed on charges of treason at the 1936 purge trial.
- Kaminsky, former Peoples Commissar of Health, purged in 1937.
- Kartvelishvili - Lavrentiev, former Communist party secretary in the Transcaucasus who was purged in 1931, allegedly as a result of plotting by Beria.
- Kedrov, Beria purge victim otherwise unidentified.
- Kerensky, Alexander F., head of the Provisional Government of Russia, which was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in November, 1917.
- Khlopov, deputy Soviet military attache in Berlin in 1941.
- Kirov, Sergei M., top Soviet Communist party leader and Politburo member who was murdered in 1934. His murder is usually regarded as having been the starting point of the period of the greatest Soviet purges in the mid-Nineteen Thirties.
- Komarov, purge victim rehabilitated in 1955 but otherwise unidentified. Believed to be an old Bolshevik prominent in the party in Nineteen Twenties.
- Kosaryev, Alexander A., former Secretary General of the Young Communist League of the Soviet Union. His purge was announced Nov. 23, 1938 on charges that he had protected immoral and anti-Communist elements in that organization and had failed to purge the league as Stalin had ordered in 1937.
- Kosior, Stanislaw V., elected to the Soviet Communist party Politburo in 1930. Disappeared in 1938, a victim of the purge.
- Krupskaya, Nadezhda K., Lenin's wife. Stalin's insulting attitude toward her brought Lenin's wrath upon him.
- Kuznetsov, A. A., former top Communist party leader executed after World War II after having been "framed" in the Leningrad case.
- Lassalle, Ferdinand, important nineteenth century Socialist leader and theoretician.
- Malenkov, Georgi M., one of Stalin's chief proteges. Succeeded Stalin as Premier in March, 1953, when Stalin died. Resigned post in February, 1955. Member of the Communist party Presidium.
- Meretskov, Marshal Kirill A., Soviet World War II military commander.
- Mezheuk, Valery I., former head of the Soviet State Planning Commission, who disappeared after March, 1937.
- Mikoyan, Anastas I., one of Stalin's oldest colleagues and supporters. Now a First Deputy Premier and member of the Communist party Presidium.

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., one of Stalin's oldest colleagues and supporters. Now First Premier and member of the Communist party Presidium. Resigned as Foreign Minister last week.

Nikolayev, investigative judge in the Eikhe case.

Nikolayev, Leonid V., the assassin of Kirov.

Ordzhonikidze, Grigori K. (Sergo), one of the highest Soviet leaders from his election to the Politburo in 1930 to his death in 1937.

Podlas, Soviet World War II commander.

Popkov, Peter S., Soviet Communist party leader who was a victim of the fabricated Leningrad case after World War II.

Poskrebshev, A. N., Stalin's aide de camp and personal friend who has not been heard from or seen since Stalin's death in March, 1953. Generally believed to have been purged by Stalin's successors.

Postyshev, Pavel P., former Communist party leader in the Ukraine who disappeared in 1937 after he had protested against the Stalinist excesses. He had earlier purged his predecessors in the Ukraine for being too nationalistic for Stalin's liking.

Pozern, purge victim and member of 1937 Leningrad center not otherwise identified.

Rodionov, Mikhail I., former Premier of the Russian Soviet Republic and a victim of the Leningrad case after World War II.

Rodos, one of the investigative judges during the purges of the nineteen thirties who was called before the party Presidium in 1956.

Rodzianko, M., a leader in the Duma (Parliament) of Russia in the last years of the Czarist regime.

Rokossovsky, Marshal Konstantin, now head of the Polish armed forces. During World War II he was a leading Soviet military commander though earlier he had been unjustly arrested and jailed by Stalin.

Rozenblum, a purge victim arrested in Leningrad in 1937.

Rudzutak, Jan E., a Politburo member from 1927 to 1931. He was formerly People's Commissar of Railroads and head of the party's Central Control Commission. As head of the commission, he supervised the expulsion of 17 per cent of the party's membership in 1934. He disappeared in 1938.

Rukhimovich, presumably a purge victim not otherwise identified.

Shaposhnikova, purge victim who was said to be member of 1937 Leningrad center.

Snegov, a member of the Transcaucasian Communist party committee in the 1930's. He was imprisoned for 17 years before being rehabilitated.

Timashuk, Dr. Lydia F. The woman who inaugurated the fabricated "doctors' plot" of 1953 by sending a letter accusing leading Soviet physicians of having tried to murder high Soviet leaders. First highly rewarded and praised, her fate since the plot was repudiated is unknown.

Tito, Marshal, Communist leader of Yugoslavia whom Stalin expelled from the Cominform in 1948. From mid-1948 to Stalin's death in 1953, the resources of

the Communist world were thrown into the effort to overthrow and destroy the Tito's regime. Marshal Tito's success in standing up to Stalin, with United States, British, and French aid, led to the post-Stalin Soviet apology that was followed by Marshall Tito's triumphant visit to Moscow.

Ugarov, purge victim who was said to be member of 1937 Leningrad center.

Ushakov, investigative judge in the Eikhe case.

Vasilevsky, Marshal Alexander M., one of the Soviet Union's highest military leaders. Now First Deputy Minister of Defense.

Vinogradov, Prof. V. N., one of the Soviet Union's most eminent physicians. He was one of the doctors accused in the 1953 fabricated "doctors' plot" case of having tried to murder high Soviet leaders. He has been fully rehabilitated.

Vorontsov, Capt., Soviet military attache in Berlin in 1941.

Voznesensky, Nikolai A., former chief Soviet planner and Politburo member who disappeared in 1949 and is now known to have been executed. He was the highest ranking victim of the Leningrad case.

Yagoda, Henry G., former head of the Soviet secret police and one of the chief purgers until his own arrest. He was tried and executed in 1938 on the charge of treason and of having murdered Maxim Gorky, Soviet writer.

Yenukidze, Abel S., once Stalin's closest friend from the days of their youth in their native Georgia. Yenukidze became one of the highest Soviet government officials in the early 1930's. In 1935, he was forced to apologize for having exaggerated his role in the Caucasian revolutionary movement. He was demoted to manager of the medical sanitariums in Georgia, in December 1937 he was executed after a secret trial before a military court that convicted him of espionage and terroristic activities.

Yezhov, Nikolai I., head of the secret police at the height of the mass purges after 1935. Near the close of the purge period in 1938, he was himself removed and replaced by Beria. Yezhov was reportedly executed afterward.

Zakovsky, Leonid, a high secret police official in 1937.

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi K., Soviet Minister of Defense and alternate member of the Communist party Presidium, first military man ever to attain so high a political rank. Though the outstanding Soviet military hero of World War II, he was exiled to provincial assignments shortly after the end of the war, not to re-emerge on the Moscow scene till the day after Stalin's death.

Zinoviev, Grigory E., one of the outstanding Soviet leaders in the early 1920's. President of the Communist International and a member of the Politburo of the Communist party until 1926, by which time Stalin had conclusively defeated his hopes of becoming Lenin's successor. Tried and executed on charges of treason in the great public purge trial of 1936.

TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH

Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the Party at the XXth Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the Party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior.

Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and execution of the Socialist Revolution, in the Civil War, and in the fight for the construction of Socialism in our country is universally known. Everyone knows this well. At the present we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the Party now and for the future—(we are concerned) with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

Because of the fact that not all as yet realize fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective direction of the Party and because of the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person—the Central Committee of the Party considers it absolutely necessary to make the material pertaining to this matter available to the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German political worker, Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated:

"From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. Lassalle subsequently did quite the opposite."

Sometime later Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose; and we most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally."

The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizational role of the Party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the Central Committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the workers' class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably combated the foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a "crowd" and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the Party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the Party follow the people—workers, peasants and intelligentsia. "Only he will win and retain the power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people."

Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik Communist Party as the leader and teacher of the people; he called for the presentation of all the most important questions before the opinion of knowledgeable workers, before the opinion of their Party; he said: "We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch."

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the Party in the structure of the Soviet State. He worked out Bolshevik principles of party direction and norms of Party life, stressing that the guiding principle of Party leadership is its collegiality. Already during the pre-revolutionary years Lenin called the Central Committee of the Party a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of Party principles. "During the period between con-

gresses," pointed out Lenin, "the Central Committee guards and interprets the principles of the Party."

Underlining the role of the Central Committee of the Party and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group. . ."

During Lenin's life the Central Committee of the Party was a real expression of collective leadership of the Party and of the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of Party life were realized, that the Party statute was enforced, that the Party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee took place at the proper intervals.

In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for the victory of the working class and of the working peasants, for the victory of our Party and for the application of the ideas of scientific communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that he is capricious and abuses his power.

In December 1922 in a letter to the Party Congress Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "After taking over the position of Secretary General Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care."

This letter—a political document of tremendous importance, known in the Party history as Lenin's "testament"—was distributed among the delegates to the XXth Party Congress. You have read it, and will undoubtedly read it again more than once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the Party, the people, the State, and the future direction of Party policy.

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man,

who above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc.”

This document of Lenin’s was made known to the delegates at the XIIIth Party Congress, who discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary General. The delegates declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety.

Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm Stalin’s character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his “testament.” These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya to Kamenev, who was at that time head of the Political Bureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.

I will now read these documents:

“Lev Borisovich!

“Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the Party. During all these thirty years I have never heard from any comrade one word of rudeness. The business of the Party and of Ilyich are not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at present the maximum of self-control. What one can and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich—I know better than any doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and what does not, in any case I know better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory as to much closer comrades of V. I. and I beg you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile invectives and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unanimous decision of the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor the time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a living person and my nerves are strained to the utmost.

N. Krupskaya”

Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on 23 December 1922. After two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:

“To Comrade Stalin:

“Copies for: Kamenev and Zinoviev.

"Dear Comrade Stalin!

"You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me, and I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologizing or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us.

(Commotion in the hall)

5 March 1923"

Sincerely: Lenin

Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin's life, could thus behave toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, whom the Party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of the Party since its creation—we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character.

As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified: in the first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his (i. e., Lenin's) advice, but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the Party and of the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our Party.

We have to consider seriously and analyze correctly this matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work, and who practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts.

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to

prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position—was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the XVIIth Party Congress, when many prominent Party leaders and rank-and-file Party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of Communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.

We must affirm that the Party had fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully as a result of which the Party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role.

The Party led a great political ideological struggle against those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a political line hostile to the Party and to the cause of Socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us, or orientation toward "cotton-dress industrialization," or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry, we would not have the Kolkhozes, we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement.

It was for this reason that the Party led an inexorable ideological fight and explained to all Party members and to the non-Party masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportunists. And this great work of explaining the Party line bore fruit; both the Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically isolated; the overwhelming Party majority supported the Leninist line and the Party was able to awaken and organize the working masses to apply the Leninist Party line and to build Socialism.

Worth noting is the fact that even during the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites and others—extreme repressive measures were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later when Socialism in our country was fundamentally constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when the Soviet social structure had radically changed, when the social basis for political movements and groups hostile to the Party had violently contracted, when the ideological opponents of the Party were long since defeated politically—then the repression directed against them began.

It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression through the government apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism — Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by the Party, and subsequently also against many honest Communists, against those Party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the Civil War and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who actively fought against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist Party line.

Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. This concept, "enemy of the people," actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved, "confessions" were acquired through physical pressures against the accused.

This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the Party line, became victims.

We must assert that in regard to those persons who in their time had opposed the Party line, there were often no sufficient serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula, "enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.

It is a fact that many persons, who were later annihilated as enemies of the Party and people had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of these persons had made errors during Lenin's life, but, despite this, Lenin benefited by their work, he corrected them and he did everything possible to retain them in the ranks of the Party; he induced them to follow him.

In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin directed to the Central Committee's Political Bureau in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that the Commission should be transformed into a real "organ of Party and proletarian conscience."

"As a special duty of the Control Commission there is recommended a deep, individualized relationship with, and sometimes even a type of thera-

py for, the representatives of the so-called opposition — those who have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soviet or Party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way used among comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be formulated by the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau, etc."

Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct Party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his practice of directing the Party demanded the most intimate Party contact with people who had shown indecision or temporary nonconformity with the Party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the application of extreme methods.

Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres.

An entirely different relationship with people characterized Stalin. Lenin's traits — patient work with people; stubborn and painstaking education of them; the ability to induce people to follow him without using compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them of the whole collective—were entirely foreign to Stalin. He (Stalin) discarded the Leninist method of convincing and educating; he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions, and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.

Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation.

This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the Party ranks and of all strata of working people, but on the contrary brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the Party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.

Our Party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of Socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the Party's devotion to principles been skillfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side—we certainly would not have had such a brutal violation of

revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim of the method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.

Let us recall some historical facts.

In the days before the October Revolution two members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party — Kamenev and Zinoviev — declared themselves against Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. In addition, on 18 October they published in the Menshevik newspaper, *Novaya Zhizn*, a statement declaring that the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and that they considered it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed to the enemy the decision of the Central Committee to stage the uprising, and that the uprising had been organized to take place within the very near future.

This was treason against the Party and against the revolution. In this connection, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Kamenev and Zinoviev revealed the decision of the Central Committee of their Party on the armed uprising to Rodzyanko and Kerensky. . ." He put before the Central Committee the question of Zinoviev's and Kamenev's expulsion from the Party.

However, after the Great Socialist October Revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions. Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most responsible Party tasks and participated actively in the work of the leading Party and Soviet organs. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during Lenin's life. In his "testament" Lenin warned that "Zinoviev's and Kamenev's October episode was of course not an accident." But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly not their shooting.

Or let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present, after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the Party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who in their time joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in the workers' movement before the revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived such an extreme method would not have been used against many of them.

Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the revolution when this was actually necessary? No, no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the revolution and of the working class and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall only V. I. Lenin's fight with the Socialist Revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and not against those who blunder, who err, and whom it was possible to lead through ideological influence, and even retain in the leadership.

Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our Party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the Party and the Soviet government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed V. I. Lenin.

Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beriia gang, the Central Committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the Central Committee, not asking for the opinion of the Committee members nor even of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very important Party and government matters.

* * * *

Considering the question of the cult of an individual we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our Party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the Party's role and significance in the direction of the Socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for a successful building of Socialism in our country. Pointing to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik Party, as a ruling party in the Soviet State, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of Party life; he called for the realization of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the Party and the State.

Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our Party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all Party matters are accomplished by all Party members—directly or through representatives—who without any exceptions are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegia, all holders of Party positions are elective, they must account for their activities and are recallable."

It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so unimportant that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau.

In the most difficult period for our Party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convoke congresses, Party conferences, and plenary sessions of the Central Committee at which all the most important questions were discussed and where resolutions, carefully worked out by the collective of leaders, were approved.

We can recall, for an example, the year 1918 when the country was threatened by the attack of the imperialistic interventionists. In this situation the VIIth Party Congress was convened in order to discuss a vitally important matter which could not be postponed—the matter of peace. In 1919, while the Civil War was raging, the VIIIth Party Congress convened which adopted a new Party program, decided such important matters as the relationship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red Army, the leading role of the Party in the work of the Soviets, the correction of the social composition of the Party, and other matters. In 1920 the IXth Congress was convened which laid down guiding principles pertaining to the Party's work in the sphere of economic construction. In 1921, the Xth Party Congress accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the historical resolution called, "About Party Unity."

During Lenin's life Party Congresses were convened regularly; always, when a radical turn in the development of the Party and the country took place, Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the Party discuss at

length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and foreign policy and to questions bearing on the development of Party and government.

It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the Party Congress as the highest Party organ his last articles, letters and remarks. During the period between congresses the Central Committee of the Party, acting as the most authoritative leading collective, meticulously observed the principles of the Party and carried out its policy.

So it was during Lenin's life.

Were our Party's holy Leninist principles observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?

Whereas during the first few years after Lenin's death Party Congresses and Central Committee plenums took place more or less regularly, later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when over 13 years elapsed between the XVIIIth and XIXth Party Congresses, years during which our Party and our country had experienced so many important events? These events demanded categorically that the Party should have passed resolutions pertaining to the country's defense during the Patriotic War and to peacetime construction after the war. Even after the end of the war a Congress was not convened for over 7 years.

Central Committee plenums were hardly ever called. It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not a single Central Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and to talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members.

In practice Stalin ignored the norms of Party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership.

Stalin's wilfulness vis-a-vis the Party and its Central Committee became **fully evident after the XVIIth Party Congress** which took place in 1934.

Having at its disposal numerous data showing brutal willfulness toward Party cadres, the Central Committee had created a Party Commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium; it was charged with investigating what made possible the mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the XVIIth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The Commission has become acquainted with a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of Socialist legality—which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic activists, who were branded in 1937-1938 as “enemies,” were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists; they were only so stigmatized and often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigative judges—falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes. The Commission has presented to the Central Committee Presidium lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to the XVIIth Party Congress and against members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress. These materials have been studied by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the XVIIth Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). (Indignation in the hall.)

What was the composition of the delegates to the XVIIth Congress? It is known that eighty percent of the voting participants of the XVIIth Congress joined the Party during the years of conspiracy before the Revolution and during the Civil War; this means before 1921. By social origin the basic mass of the delegates to the Congress were workers (60 percent of the voting members).

For this reason, it was inconceivable that a Congress so composed would have elected a Central Committee a majority of whom would prove to be enemies of the Party. The only reason why 70 percent of Central Committee members and candidates elected at the XVIIth Congress were branded as enemies of the Party and of the people was because honest Communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.

The same fate met not only the Central Committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the XVIIth Party Congress. Of 1966 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were the charges of counter-revolutionary crimes made out, as we now see, against a majority of participants at the XVIIth Party Congress. (Indignation in the hall.)

We should recall that the XVIIth Party Congress is historically known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the Congress were active partici-

pants in the building of our Socialist State; many of them suffered and fought for Party interests during the pre-revolutionary years in the conspiracy and at the Civil War fronts; they fought their enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death. How then can we believe that such people could prove to be "two-faced" and had joined the camps of the enemies of Socialism during the era after the political liquidation of Zinovievites, Trotskyites and rightists and after the great accomplishments of Socialist construction?

This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against the Party cadres.

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the XVIIth Party Congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the Party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party. While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the XVIIth Congress after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and Socialist victories the Party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the members of the Party's Central Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he needed were statisticians; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.

After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the evening of 1 December 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau—which was passed two days later, casually) the secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive.

"I. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.

"II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee USSR does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.

"III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the death sentences against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences."

This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against Socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with "the preparation" of terroristic acts; this deprived them of

any possibility that their cases might be re-examined, even when they stated before the court that their "confessions" were secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them.

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov. A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behavior, but he was released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on 2 December 1934, he was killed in a car "accident" in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Lenin-grad NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing. (Movement in the hall.)

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on 25 September 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows:

"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is 4 years behind in this matter. This is noted by all Party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD." Strictly speaking we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and therefore could not know the opinion of party workers.

This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD (term used interchangeably with 'OGPU') * is 4 years behind" in applying mass repression and that there is a necessity for "catching up" with the neglected work directly pushed the NKVD workers on the path of mass arrests and executions.

We should state that this formulation was also forced on the February-March plenary session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary resolution approved it on the basis of Yezhov's report, "Lessons flowing from the harmful activity, diversion and espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents," stating:

"The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that all facts revealed during the investiga-

* The content of this parenthesis is an editorial note of the translator.

tion into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and of its followers in the provinces show that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has fallen behind at least 4 years in the attempt to unmask these most inexorable enemies of the people."

The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our Party and to the Soviet State? We should recall that in 1927 on the eve of the XVth Party Congress only some 4,000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, while there were 724,000 for the Party line. During the 10 years which passed between the XVth Party Congress and the February-March Central Committee Plenum Trotskyism was completely disarmed; many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and worked in the various sectors building Socialism. It is clear that in the situation of Socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the country.

Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee Plenum in 1937, "Deficiencies of Party work and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and of other two-facers," contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward Socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.

Actually Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary violence is necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting classes, and this referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the nation's political situation had improved, when in January 1920 the Red Army took Rostov and thus won a most important victory over Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzherzhinsky to stop mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political move of the Soviet State in the following manner in his report at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee on 2 February 1920:

"We were forced to use terror because of the terror practiced by the Entente, when strong world powers threw their hordes against us, not avoiding any type of conduct. We would not have lasted two days had we not answered these attempts of officers and White Guardists in a merciless fashion; this meant the use of terror, but this was forced upon us by the terrorist methods of the Entente.

"But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to execute our own program in the manner that we promised. We say that the application of violence flows out of the decision to smother the exploiters, the big landowners and

the capitalists; as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use of all extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."

Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin. Stalin put the Party and the NKVD up to the use of mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.

This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes but against the honest workers of the Party and of the Soviet State; against them were made lying, slanderous and absurd accusations concerning "two-facedness," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation of fictitious "plots," etc.

At the February-March Central Committee Plenum in 1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding mass repressions under the pretext of combating "two-facedness."

Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He said:

"I have philosophized that the severe years of fighting have passed, Party members who have lost their backbones have broken down or have joined the camp of the enemy; healthy elements have fought for the Party. These were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would find themselves in the camp of the enemy (Karpov was a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.) And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1934 an honest Party member who had trod the long road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the Party and for Socialism, would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it . . . I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with the Party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing . . ." (Movement in the hall.)

Using Stalin's formulation, namely that the closer we are to Socialism the more enemies we will have, and using the resolution of the February-March Central Committee Plenum passed on the basis of Yezhov's report—the provocateurs who had infiltrated the state security organs together with conscienceless careerists began to protect with the Party name the mass terror against Party cadres, cadres of the Soviet State and the ordinary Soviet citizens. It should suffice to say that the number of arrests based on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes had grown ten times between 1936 and 1937.

It is known that brutal willfulness was practiced against leading Party workers. The Party Statute, approved at the XVIIth Party Congress

was based on Leninist principles expressed at the Xth Party Congress. It stated that in order to apply an extreme method such as exclusion from the Party against a Central Committee member, against a Central Committee candidate, and against a member of the Party Control Commission, "it is necessary to call a Central Committee Plenum and to invite to the Plenum all Central Committee candidate members and all members of the Party Control Commission"; only if two thirds of the members of such a general assembly of responsible Party leaders find it necessary, only then can a Central Committee member or candidate be expelled.

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the XVIIth Congress and arrested in 1937-1938 were expelled from the Party illegally through the brutal abuse of the Party Statute, because the question of their expulsion was never studied at the Central Committee Plenum.

Now when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and "saboteurs" were examined it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures.

At the same time Stalin, as we have been informed by members of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them the statements of many accused political activists when they retracted their confessions before the military tribunal and asked for an objective examination of their cases. There were many such declarations, and Stalin doubtless knew of them.

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the members of the Party's Central Committee elected at the XVIIth Party Congress.

An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate for the Central Committee Political Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the Party and of the Soviet government, Comrade Eikhe, who was a Party member since 1905. (Commotion in the hall.)

Comrade Eikhe was arrested on 29 April 1938 on the basis of slanderous materials, without the sanction of the Prosecutor of the USSR, which was finally received 15 months after the arrest.

Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by willfulness and falsification.

Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative judges, in which he and several other eminent Party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activity.

On 1 October 1939 Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which he

categorically denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case. In the declaration he wrote:

"There is no more bitter misery than to sit in the jail of a government for which I have always fought."

A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved which he sent to Stalin on 27 October 1939; in it he cited facts very convincingly and countered the slanderous accusations made against him, arguing that this provocative accusation was on the one hand the work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had sanctioned as First Secretary of the West Siberian Krai Party Committee and who conspired in order to take revenge on him, and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of materials by the investigative judges.

Eikhe wrote in his declaration: ". . . On 25 October of this year I was informed that the investigation in my case has been concluded and I was given access to the materials of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one-hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I would not have dared to send you this pre-execution declaration; however, I have not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now, finding my two feet in the grave, I am also not lying. My whole case is a typical example of provocation, slander and violation of the elementary basis of revolutionary legality. . .

". . . The confessions which were made part of my file are not only absurd but contain some slander toward the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and toward the Council of People's Commissars because correct resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Council of People's Commissars which were not made on my initiative and without my participation are presented as hostile acts of counter-revolutionary organizations made at my suggestion. . . .

"I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life and to my really grave guilt against the Party and against you. This is my confession of counter-revolutionary activity. . . . The case is as follows: not being able to suffer the tortures to which I was submitted by Ushakov and Nikolayev—and especially by the first one—who utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs have not properly mended and have caused me great pain—I have been forced to accuse myself and others.

"The majority of my confession has been suggested or dictated by Ushakov, and the remainder is my reconstruction of NKVD materials from western Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility. If some

part of the story which Ushakov fabricated and which I signed did not properly hang together, I was forced to sign another variation. The same thing was done to Rukhimovich, who was at first designated as a member of the reserve net and whose name later was removed without telling me anything about it; the same was also done with the leader of the reserve net, supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first I wrote my name in, and then I was instructed to insert Mezhlauk. There were other similar incidents.

"... I am asking and begging you that you again examine my case and this not for the purpose of sparing me but in order to unmask the vile provocation which like a snake wound itself around many persons in a great degree due to my meanness and criminal slander. I have never betrayed you or the Party. I know that I perish because of vile and mean work of the enemies of the Party and of the people, who fabricated the provocation against me."

It would appear that such an important declaration was worth an examination by the Central Committee. This, however, was not done and the declaration was transmitted to Beriya while the terrible maltreatment of the Political Bureau candidate, Comrade Eikhe, continued.

On 2 February 1940 Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he did not confess any guilt and said as follows:

"In all the so-called confessions of mine there is not one letter written by me with the exception of my signatures under the protocols which were forced from me. I have made my confession under pressure from the investigative judge who from the time of my arrest tormented me. After that I began to write all this nonsense. . . . The most important thing for me is to tell the court, the Party and Stalin that I am not guilty. I have never been guilty of any conspiracy. I will die believing in the truth of Party policy as I have believed in it during my whole life."

On 4 February Eikhe was shot. (Indignation in the hall.) It has been definitely established now that Eikhe's case was fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated.

Comrade Rudzutak, candidate member of the Political Bureau, member of the Party since 1905, who spent 10 years in a Czarist hard labor camp, completely retracted in court the confession which was forced from him. The protocol of the session of the Collegium of the Supreme Military Court contains the following statement by Rudzutak:

"... The only plea which he places before the court is that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) be informed that there is in the NKVD an as yet not liquidated center which is craftily manufacturing cases, which forces innocent persons to con-

fess; there is no opportunity to prove one's nonparticipation in crimes to which the confessions of various persons testify. The investigative methods are such that they force people to lie and to slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those who already stand accused. He asks the Court that he be allowed to inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) about all this in writing. He assures the Court that he personally had never any evil designs in regard to the policy of our Party because he had always agreed with the Party policy pertaining to all spheres of economic and cultural activity."

This declaration of Rudzutak was ignored, despite the fact that Rudzutak was in his time the chief of the Central Control Commission which was called into being in accordance with Lenin's concept for the purpose of fighting for Party unity. In this manner fell the chief of this highly authoritative Party organ, a victim of brutal willfulness: he was not even called before the Central Committee's Political Bureau because Stalin did not want to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was shot. (Indignation in the hall.)

After careful examination of the case in 1955 it was established that the accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it was based on slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously.

The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and "blocs" with the help of provocative methods is seen from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, Party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad NKVD.

During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case Rozenblum revealed the following fact: when Rozenblum was arrested in 1937 he was subjected to terrible torture during which he was ordered to confess false information concerning himself and other persons. He was then brought to the office of Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on condition that he make before the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic center in Leningrad." (Movement in the hall.) With unbelievable cynicism Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the crafty creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."

"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum, "Zakovsky gave me several possible variants of the organization of this center and of its branches. After he detailed the organization to me, Zakovsky told me that the NKVD would prepare the case of this center, remarking that the trial would be public.

"Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members of this center: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife)

and others together with 2 or 3 members from the branches of this center. . . .

" . . . The case of the Leningrad center has to be built solidly and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social origin (of course, in the past) and the Party standing of the witness will play more than a small role.

"You, yourself," said Zakovsky, "will not need to invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully and to remember well all questions and answers which the Court might ask. This case will be ready in 4-5 months, or perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be preparing yourself so that you will not compromise the investigation and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and we will feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death."

This is the kind of vile things which were then practiced. (Movement in the hall.)

Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced in the provinces. The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov Oblast "discovered" the so-called "Ural uprising staff"—an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church leaders—whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kabakov, who had been a Party member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show that in almost all krais, oblasts and republics there supposedly existed "rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centers" and that the heads of such organizations as a rule—for no known reason—were first secretaries of oblast or republic Communist Party committees or Central Committees. (Movement in the hall.)

Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases," as a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous "confessions" were accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases" against eminent Party and State workers—Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosaryev, and others.

In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the Party.

The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Col-

legium and whose sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov would send these lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the names of many thousands of Party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army and economic workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.

A large part of these cases are being reviewed now and a great part of them are being voided because they were baseless and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously.

Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of Socialist advancement.

Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the Party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and sowed distrust among Communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.

Resolutions of the January Plenum of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1938 had brought some measure of improvement to the Party organizations. However, widespread repression also existed in 1938.

Only because our Party has at its disposal such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres. There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward Socialism and toward the preparation of the country's defense would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.

We are justly accusing Yezhov for the degenerate practices of 1937. But we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior, for instance, without the knowledge of Stalin? Was there an exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau decision concerning this? No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type. Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent Party figures? No, it would be a display of naivete to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not have done this.

We have examined the cases and have rehabilitated Kossior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosaryev and others. For what causes were they arrested and sentenced? The review of evidence shows that there was no reason for this. They, like many others, were arrested without the Prosecutor's

knowledge. In such a situation there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of a sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything. He was the chief prosecutor in these cases. Stalin not only agreed to, but on his own initiative issued arrest orders. We must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly undertake and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.

Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin's orders without reckoning with any norms of Party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious; we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man and say: "Why are your eyes so shifty today," or "Why are you turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in the eyes?" The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies," "two-facers" and "spies."

Possessing unlimited power he indulged in great willfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where one could not express one's own will.

When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of the people." Meanwhile, Beriya's gang, which ran the organs of the state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified. And what proofs were offered? The confessions of the arrested, and the investigative judges accepted these "confessions." And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed? Only in one way—because of application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away of his human dignity. In this manner were "confessions" acquired.

When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939, and the leaders of territorial Party organizations began to accuse the NKVD workers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on 20 January 1939 to the committee secretaries of oblasts and krais, to the Central Committees of republic Communist Parties, to the Peoples Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of NKVD organizations. This telegram stated:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in accordance with permission of the Central Committee for the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). . . . It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use

methods of physical influence against the representatives of the Socialist proletariat and that they use them in their most scandalous forms. The question arises as to why the Socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the working class and of the Kolkhoz workers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate."

Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of Socialist legality, torture and oppression, which led as we have seen to the slandering and self-accusation of innocent people.

Not long ago—only several days before the present Congress—we called to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosaryev. He is a vile person, with the brain of a bird, and morally completely degenerate. And it was this man who was deciding the fate of prominent Party workers; he was making judgments also concerning the politics in these matters, because having established their "crime," he provided therewith materials from which important political implications could be drawn.

The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could alone make the investigation in a manner to prove the guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not have done it without proper directives. At the Central Committee Presidium session he told us: "I was told that Kossior and Chubar were people's enemies and for this reason, I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they are enemies." (Indignation in the hall.)

He could do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beriia. We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: "I thought that I was executing the orders of the Party." In this manner Stalin's orders concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested were in practice executed.

These and many other facts show that all norms of correct Party solution of problems were invalidated and everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one man.

The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.

When we look at many of our novels, films and historical "scientific

studies," the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called "active defense," i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the Land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.

We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical point of view.

What are the facts of this matter?

Before the war our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: when an enemy violates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer with three blows and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.

During the war and after the war Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, Comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism. The Fascists were saying this openly; they did not hide their plans. In order to attain this aggressive end all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. Many facts from the pre-war period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet State and that he had concentrated large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.

Documents which have now been published show that by 3 April 1941 Churchill, through his ambassador to the USSR Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union. It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in this his own imperialistic goals — to bring Germany and the USSR into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire. Just the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to "warn Stalin and call his attention to the dan-

ger which threatened him." Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of 18 April and in the following days. However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings. What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiation of military operations.

We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on 6 May 1941 by the Soviet military attache, Capt. Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet citizen Bozer . . . communicated to the deputy naval attache that according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler's Headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the USSR on 14 May through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities. . ."

In his report of 22 May 1941, the deputy military attache in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that ". . . the attack of the German army is reportedly scheduled for 15 June, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June. . ."

A cable from our London Embassy dated 18 June 1951 stated: "As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the USSR which will begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders. . ."

Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.

Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet army with everything that it needed. This is proven by the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still able to organize the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the Western industrial areas, and to supply our armed forces with everything which was necessary to destroy the enemy.

Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the army with the necessary material our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our army was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.

Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not organized and as a matter of fact we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war. As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet land we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production. The situation with antiaircraft artillery was especially bad; we did not organize the production of anti-tank ammunition. Many fortified regions had proven to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because the old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.

This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him, "People have volunteered for the new army and demand arms. You must send us arms."

Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send your arms. We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves." (Movement in the hall.)

Such was the armament situation.

In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact. Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army, Kirponos, who was Chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front) wrote to Stalin that the German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start their offensive. In this connection Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border areas and that several strong points be organized there: anti-tank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.

Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.

When the Fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and mili-

tary operations began, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned. Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.

The following fact is also known. On the eve of the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on the night 22 June at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.

As you see, everything was ignored; warnings of certain army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of the alertness of the Chief of the Party and of the State at this particularly significant historical moment?

And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts? The result was that already in the first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border region a large part of our air force, artillery and other military equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.

The policy of large-scale repression against the military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the Party and Komsomol cells were taught to "unmask" their superiors as hidden enemies. (Movement in the hall.) It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period.

And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and to the Fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the

Fatherland; I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed), Gorbatov, Maretskov (who is a delegate at the present Congress), Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front), and many, many others. However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the army saw them no more.

All this brought about the situation which existed at the beginning of the war and which was the great threat to our Fatherland.

It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: "All that which Lenin created we have lost forever."

After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately in order to improve the situation at the front.

Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our Fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party by Stalin himself.

However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to serious disorganization of our army and brought us severe losses. Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual military operations, caused our army serious damage.

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation which was developing at the front. This was natural because during the whole Patriotic War he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk Highway during a stabilized situation at the front. To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders which did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact which illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshal Bagramyan who was once the Chief of Operations in the Headquarters of the South-Western front and who can corroborate what I will tell you.

When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our army in 1942 in the Kharkov region, we had correctly decided to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov, because the real situation

at that time would have threatened our army with fatal consequences if this operation were continued.

We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our army.

Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with encirclement and liquidation.

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him, "Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map (Vasilevsky is present here) and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed." We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (Animation in the hall.) Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the frontline on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot continue the operation which was planned. The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause."

Vasilevsky replied saying that Stalin had already studied this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning this matter, because the latter didn't want to hear any arguments on the subject of this operation.

After my talk with Vasilevsky I telephoned to Stalin at his villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov. I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin personally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the phone and again stated that I should speak to him through Malenkov, although he was only a few steps from the telephone.

After "listening" in this manner to our plea Stalin said, "Let everything remain as it is!"

And what was the result of this? The worst that we had expected. The Germans surrounded our army concentrations and consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This is Stalin's military "genius;" this is what is cost us. (Movement in the hall.)

On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.

You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is after all a "genius," and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right. He never acknowledged to anyone that he made any mistake, large or small, despite the fact that he made not a few mistakes in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime military operations and to present them in their true light.

The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the essence of the conduct of battle operations cost us much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the offensive.

The military know that already by the end of 1941 instead of great operational maneuvers flanking the opponent and penetrating behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with great losses until our generals, on whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuver operations, which immediately brought serious changes at the front favorable to us.

All the more shameful was the fact that after our great victory over the enemy which cost us so much, Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders who contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.

Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense about Zhukov, among others the following, "You praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it. It is said that before each operation at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: he used to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or the opposite, 'the planned operation cannot be carried out.'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.

In this connection Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader; in various ways he tried to inculcate in the people the version that all victories gained by the Soviet nation during the Great Patriotic War were due to the courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one else. Exactly like Kuzma Kryuchkov (a famous Cossack who performed

heroic feats against the Germans)*, he put one dress on 7 people at the same time. (Animation in the hall.)

In the same vein, let us take, for instance, our historical and military films and some literary creations; they make us feel sick. Their true objective is the propagation of the theme of praising Stalin as a military genius. Let us recall the film, "The Fall of Berlin." Here only Stalin acts; he issues orders in the hall in which there are many empty chairs and only one man approached him and reports something to him — that is Poskrebyshv, his loyal shield-bearer. (Laughter in the hall.)

And where is the military command? Where is the Political Bureau? Where is the Government? What are they doing and with what are they engaged? There is nothing about them in the film. Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he asks no one for advice. Everything is shown to the nation in this false light. Why? In order to surround Stalin with glory, contrary to historical truth.

The question arises: And where are the military on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? They are not in the film; with Stalin in, no room was left for them.

Not Stalin, but the Party as a whole, the Soviet Government, our heroic army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation — these are the ones who assured the victory in the Great Patriotic War. (Tempestuous and prolonged applause.)

The Central Committee members, ministers, our economic leaders, leaders of Soviet culture, directors of territorial Party and Soviet organizations, engineers, and technicians — everyone of them in his own place of work generously gave of his strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the enemy.

Exceptional heroism was shown by our hard core — surrounded by glory is our whole working class, our kolkhoz peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of Party organizations overcame untold hardships and, bearing the hardships of war, devoted all their strength to the cause of the defense of the Fatherland.

Great and brave deeds during the war were accomplished by our Soviet women who bore on their backs the heavy load of production work in the factories, on the kolkhozes, and in various economic and cultural sectors; many women participated directly in the Great Patriotic War at the fronts; our brave youth contributed immeasurably at the front and at home to the defense of the Soviet Fatherland and to the annihilation of the enemy.

Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our commanders and

* The content of this parenthesis is an editorial comment of the translator.

political workers of all ranks; after the loss of a considerable part of the army in the first war months they did not lose their heads and were able to reorganize during the progress of combat; they created and toughened during the progress of the war a strong and heroic army and not only stood off pressure of the strong and cunning enemy but also smashed him.

The magnificent and heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the East and of the West during the fight against the threat of Fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live centuries and millenia in the memory of thankful humanity. ((Thunderous applause.)

The main role and the main credit for the victorious ending of the war belongs to our Communist Party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people raised by the Party. (Thunderous and prolonged applause.)

Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet Union is justly considered as a model of a multi-national State because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all nations which live in our great Fatherland.

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet State. We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations, together with all Communists and Komsomols without any exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations.

Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a permanent breakthrough at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War benefiting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944 all the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardynian Republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have deported them also. (Laughter and animation in the hall.)

Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to

use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

After the conclusion of the Patriotic War the Soviet nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The Party came out of the war even more united; in the fire of the war Party cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the Party.

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called "Leningrad Affair" was born. As we have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others.

As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is sufficient to mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first deputy to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was elected Secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the State security organs shows the trust which he enjoyed.

How did it happen that these persons were branded as enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the "Leningrad Affair" is also the result of willfulness which Stalin exercised against Party cadres.

Had a normal situation existed in the Party's Central Committee and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, affairs of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with Party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result such an affair as well as others would not have happened.

We must state that after the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. After the war Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or anything.

This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage of by the abject provocateur and vile enemy, Beriya, who had murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people. The elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beriya. As we have proven, it had been precisely Beriya who had "suggested" to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his confidants of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of various rumors and talks.

The Party's Central Committee has examined this so-called "Leningrad Affair"; persons who innocently suffered are now rehabilitated and honor has been restored to the glorious Leningrad Party organization, Abakumov and others who had fabricated this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place in Leningrad and they received what they deserved.

The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this affair only now, and why did we not do something earlier, during Stalin's life, in order to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised the "Leningrad Affair," and the majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene.

When Stalin received certain materials from Beriia and Abakumov, without examining these slanderous materials, he ordered an investigation of the "Affair" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. With this their fate was sealed. Instructive in the same way is the case of the Mingrelian nationalist organization which supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known, resolutions by the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were made concerning this case in November 1951 and in March 1952. These resolutions were made without prior discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious accusations against many loyal Communists. On the basis of falsified documents it was proven that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that Republic with the help of imperialist powers.

In this connection, a number of responsible Party and Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proven, this was a slander directed against the Georgian Party Organization.

We know that there have been at times manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism in Georgia as in several other republics. The question arises: Could it be possible that in the period during which the resolutions referred to above were made, nationalist tendencies grew so much that there was a danger of Georgia's leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey? (Animation in the hall, laughter.)

This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine how such assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule.

Industrial production of the Georgian Republic is 27 times greater than it was before the revolution. Many new industries have arisen in Georgia which did not exist there before the revolution: iron smelting, an oil industry, a machine construction industry, etc. Illiteracy has long since been

liquidated, which, in pre-revolutionary Georgia, included 78 percent of the population.

Could the Georgians, comparing the situation in their Republic with the hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, be aspiring to join Turkey? In 1955 Georgia produced 18 times as much steel per person as Turkey. Georgia produces 9 times as much electrical energy per person as Turkey. According to the available 1950 census, 65 percent of Turkey's total population are illiterate, and of the women, 80 percent are illiterate. Georgia has 19 institutions of higher learning which have about 39,000 students; this is 8 times more than Turkey (for each 1,000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the working people has grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule.

It is clear that as the economy and culture develop, and as the Socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows, the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates.

As it developed, there was no nationalistic organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent people fell victim of willfulness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the "genial" leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian nation," as Georgians liked to refer to Stalin. (Animation in the hall.)

The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav Affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through Party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this "affair"; it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country.

I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began artificially to be blown up. Once, when I came from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin who, pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito, asked me, "Have you read this?"

Not waiting for my reply he answered, "I will shake my little finger — and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."

We have paid dearly for this "shaking of the little finger." This statement reflects Stalin's mania for greatness, but he acted just that way: "I will shake my little finger — and there will be no Kossior"; "I will shake

my little finger once more and Postyshev and Chubar will be no more"; "I will shake my little finger again — and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others will disappear."

But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin shook, not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a State and a people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders.

You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He had completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the USSR, but in relation to whole parties and nations.

We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by the working masses of all the people's democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of Socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.

Let us also recall the "Affair of the Doctor-Plotters." (Animation in the hall.) Actually there was no "Affair" outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the organs of State security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that the academician Vinogradov should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this Congress as a delegate is the Former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head." (Tumult in the hall.)

Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him instructions, advised him on which investigative methods should be used; these methods were simple — beat, beat, and once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested we members of the Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors; confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols Stalin told us, "You are blind like young

kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as he conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are working in the same places they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the Government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the rabid enemy of our Party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service — Beriya, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position in the Party and in the State, so as to become the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau? It has now been established that this villain had climbed up the government ladder over an untold number of corpses.

Were there any signs that Beriya was an enemy of the Party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937, at a Central Committee Plenum, former People's Commissar of Health Protection, Kaminsky, said that Beriya worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central Committee Plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beriya, and that was enough for him, and when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one could say anything which was contrary to his opinion; anyone who would dare to express opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky.

There were other signs also. The declaration which Comrade Snegov made at the Party's Central Committee is interesting. (Parenthetically speaking, he was also rehabilitated not long ago, after 17 years in prison camps.) In this declaration Snegov writes:

"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former Central Committee member, Kartvelishvili-Lavryentiev, I have entrusted to the hands of the representative of the Committee of State Security a detailed deposition concerning Beriya's role in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili

case and concerning the criminal motives by which Beriya was guided.”

In my opinion it is indispensable to recall an important fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central Committee, because I did not consider it as proper to include in the investigation documents.

On 30 October 1931, at the session of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kartvelishvili, Secretary of the Trans-Caucasian Krai Committee, made a report. All members of the Executive of the Krai Committee were present; of them I alone am alive. During this session J. V. Stalin made a motion at the end of his speech concerning the organization of the Secretariat of the Trans-Caucasian Krai Committee composed of the following: First Secretary Kartvelishvili; Second Secretary, Beriya (it was then for the first time in the Party's history that Beriya's name was mentioned as a candidate for a Party position). Kartvelishvili answered that he knew Beriya well and for that reason refused categorically to work together with him. Stalin proposed then that this matter be left open and that it be solved in the process of the work itself. Two days later a decision was arrived at that Beriya would receive the Party post and that Kartvelishvili would be deported from the Trans-Caucasus.

This fact can be confirmed by Comrades Mikoyan and Kaganovich who were present at that session.

The long unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and Beriya were widely known; they date back to the time when Comrade Sergo* was active in the Trans-Caucasus; Kartvelishvili was the closest assistant of Sergo. The unfriendly relationship impelled Beriya to fabricate a “case” against Kartvelishvili.

It is a characteristic thing that in this “case” Kartvelishvili was charged with a terroristic act against Beriya.

The indictment in the Beriya case contains a discussion of his crimes. Some things should, however, be recalled, especially since it is possible that not all delegates to the Congress have read this document. I wish to recall Beriya's bestial disposition of the cases of Kedrov, Golubiev, and Golubiev's adopted mother, Baturina — persons who wished to inform the Central Committee concerning Beriya's treacherous activity. They were shot without any trial and the sentence was passed *ex-post facto*, after the execution.

Here is what the old Communist, Comrade Kedrov, wrote to the Central Committee through Comrade Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev was then a Central Committee secretary):

* Translator's note: “Sergo” was the popular nickname for Ordzhonikidze.

"I am calling to you for help from a gloomy cell of the Lefortorsky prison. Let my cry of horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf; take me under your protection; please help remove the nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all a mistake.

"I suffer innocently. Please believe me. Time will testify to the truth. I am not an agent-provocateur of the Tsarist Okhrana; I am not a spy; I am not a member of an anti-Soviet organization of which I am being accused on the basis of denunciations. I am also not guilty of any other crimes against the Party and the government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any stain; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of the Party for the good and the prosperity of the nation. . .

"... Today I, a 62-year-old man, am being threatened by the investigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading methods of physical pressure. They (the judges) are no longer capable of becoming aware of their error and of recognizing that their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible. They try to justify their actions by picturing me as a hardened and raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But let the Party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing which can turn a loyal son of the Party into an enemy, even right up to his last dying breath.

"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the hastily approaching new and powerful blows.

"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has reached the extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my energy are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet prison, branded as a vile traitor to the Fatherland — what can be more monstrous for an honest man. And how monstrous all this is! Unsurpassed bitterness and pain grips my heart. No! No! This will not happen; this cannot be — I cry. Neither the Party, nor the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar, L. P. Beriya, will permit this cruel irreparable injustice. I am firmly certain that given a quiet, objective examination, without any foul rantings, without any anger and without the fearful tortures, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph. I believe. I believe."

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by the Military Collegium. But despite this, he was shot at Beriya's order. (Indignation in the hall.)

Beriya also handled cruelly the family of Comrade Ordzhonikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried to prevent Beriya from realizing his shameful plans. Beriya had cleared from his way all persons who could possibly interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze was always an opponent of

Beriya, which he told to Stalin. Instead of examining this affair and taking appropriate steps, Stalin allowed the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's brother and brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that he was forced to shoot himself. (Indignation in the hall.) Such was Beriya.

Beriya was unmasked by the Party's Central Committee shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proceedings it was established that Beriya had committed monstrous crimes and Beriya was shot.

The question arises why Beriya, who had liquidated tens of thousands of Party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked during Stalin's life? He was not unmasked earlier because he had utilized very skillfully Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with his support.

* * * *

Comrades:

The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his *Short Biography*, which was published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader," "sublime strategist of all times and nations." Finally no other words could be found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.

We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.

What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book? Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers who were composing his *Short Biography*. No! He marked the very places where he thought that the praise of his services was insufficient.

Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own hand:

"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there was definitely welded

together, after Lenin's death, that leading core of the Party. . . * that upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied the Party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet people into the broad road of industrializing the country and collectivising the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding force of the Party and the State was Comrade Stalin."

Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:

"Although he performed his task of leader of the Party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation."

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely against this did Marx and Engels take such a strong position. This also was always sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

In the draft text of his book appeared the following sentence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared to Stalin to be too weak, so in his own handwriting he changed it to read: "Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or, as it is said in our Party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." You see how well it is said, not by the nation but by Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand. Especially generously does he endow himself with praises pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning the theme of the Stalinist military genius.

"The advanced Soviet science of war received further development," he writes, "at Comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin elaborated the theory of the permanently operating factors that decide the issue of wars, of active defense and the laws of counter-offensive and offensive, of the co-operation of all services and arms in modern warfare, of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modern war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed services. At the various stages of the war Stalin's genius found the correct solutions that took account of all the circumstances of the situation." (Movement in the hall.)

And further, writes Stalin:

* Omitted portion of list as found in *A Short Biography*, by Joseph Stalin, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949, p. 89 is as follows: ". . . consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovich, Odzhonikidze, Kirov, Yaroslavsky, Mikoyan, Andreyev, Shvernik, Zhdanov, Shkiryatov and others."

"Stalin's military mastership was displayed both in defense and offense. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to divine the enemy's plans and defeat them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of operational military skill."

In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but in the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of his self-adulatory biography.

Such, comrades, are the facts. We should rather say shameful facts.

And one additional fact from the same *Short Biography* of Stalin. As is known, *The Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)* was written by a Commission of the Party Central Committee.

This book, parenthetically, was also permeated with the cult of the individual and was written by a designated group of authors. This fact was reflected in the following formulation on the proof copy of the *Short Biography of Stalin*:

"A commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), under the direction of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal participation, has prepared a *Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*."

But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin: the following sentence replaced it in the final version of the *Short Biography*:

"In 1938 appeared the book, *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, *Short Course*, written by Comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)." Can one add anything more? (Animation in the hall.)

As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the work created by a group into a book written by Stalin. It is not necessary to state how and why this metamorphosis took place.

A pertinent question comes to our mind: If Stalin is the author of this book, why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October historical period of our glorious Communist Party solely into an action of "the Stalin genius?"

Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the Party in the Socialist transformation of the country, in the construction of Socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and also other steps taken by the Party which undeviatingly traveled the path outlined by Lenin? This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception is tied to his name.

And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote the *Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)* this calls at least for amazement. Can a Marxist-Leninist thus write about himself, praising his own person to the heavens?

Or let us take the matter of the Stalin prizes. (Movement in the hall.) Not even the Tsars created prizes which they named after themselves.

Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist Party; it contains, however, the following unprecedented praise of Stalin:

“Stalin brought us up in loyalty to the people,
He inspired us to great toil and acts.”

In these lines of the anthem is the whole educational directional and inspirational activity of the great Leninist Party ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear deviation from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the Party. We should add for your information that the Presidium of the Central Committee has already passed a resolution concerning the composition of a new text of the anthem, which will reflect the role of the people, and the role of the Party. (Loud, prolonged applause.)

And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country—these “memorials to the living?” It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on 2 July 1951 a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the erection on the Volga-Don Canal of an impressive monument to Stalin; on 4 September of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for the construction of this impressive monument. Anyone who has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the huge statue which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build it at a time when people of this area had lived since the war in huts. Consider yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his biography that “. . . he did not allow in himself . . . even a shadow of conceit, pride, or self-adoration?”

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this Palace was not built, its construction was always postponed, and the project allowed to lapse.

We cannot forget to recall the Soviet Government resolution of 14 August 1925 concerning “the founding of Lenin prizes for educational work.” This resolution was published in the press, but until this day

there are no Lenin prizes. This, too, should be corrected. (Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

During Stalin's life, thanks to known methods which I have mentioned, and quoting facts, for instance, from the *Short Biography* of Stalin—all events were explained as if Lenin played only a secondary role, even during the October Socialist Revolution. In many films and in many literary works, the figure of Lenin was incorrectly presented and inadmissibly depreciated.

Stalin loved to see the film, "The Unforgettable Year of 1919," in which he was shown on the steps of an armored train and where he was practically vanquishing the foe with his own sabre. Let Kliment Yefremovich, our dear friend, find the necessary courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows how Stalin had fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov to undertake this, but it would be good if he did it. Everyone will approve of it, both the people and the Party. Even his grandsons will thank him. (Prolonged applause.)

In speaking about the events of the October Revolution and about the Civil War, the impression was created that Stalin always played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. However, this is slander of Lenin. (Prolonged applause.)

I will probably not sin against the truth when I say that 99 percent of the persons present here heard and knew very little about Stalin before the year 1924, while Lenin was known to all; he was known to the whole Party, to the whole nation, from the children up to the graybeards. (Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

All this has to be thoroughly revised, so that history, literature, and the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the Soviet people—the creative people. (Applause.)

* * * *

Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in Party work and in economic activity; it brought about rude violation of internal Party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit.

We should also not forget that due to the numerous arrests of Party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed over-cautiousness, feared all which was new, feared their own shadows and began to show less initiative in their work.

Take, for instance, Party and Soviet resolutions. They were prepared in a routine manner often without considering the concrete situation. This went so far that Party workers, even during the smallest sessions, read their speeches. All this produced the danger of formalizing the Party and Soviet work and of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus.

Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.

All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and Kolkhoz workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.

He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture.

Many films so pictured Kolkhoz life that the tables were bending from the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently Stalin thought that it was actually so.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently; he was always close to the people; he used to receive peasant delegates, and often spoke at factory gatherings; he used to visit villages and talk with the peasants.

Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere. This lasted tens of years. The last time he visited a village was in January 1928 when he visited Siberia in connection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the situation in the provinces?

And when he was once told during a discussion that our situation on the land was a difficult one and that the situation of cattle breeding and meat production was especially bad, a commission was formed which was charged with the preparation of a resolution called, "Means toward further development of animal breeding in Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes." We worked out this project.

Of course, our propositions of that time did not contain all possibilities, but we did charter ways in which animal breeding on the Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes would be raised. We had proposed then to raise the prices of such products in order to create material incentives for the Kolkhoz, MTS and Sovkhoz workers in the development of cattle breeding. But our project was not accepted and in February 1953 was laid aside entirely.

What is more, while reviewing this project Stalin proposed that the taxes paid by the Kolkhozes and by the Kolkhoz workers should be raised

by 40 billion rubles; according to him the peasants are well-off and the Kolkhoz worker would need to sell only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.

Imagine what this meant. Certainly forty billion rubles is a sum which the Kolkhoz workers did not realize for all the products which they sold to the government. In 1952, for instance, the Kolkhozes and the Kolkhoz workers received 26,280 million rubles for all their products delivered and sold to the government.

Did Stalin's position then rest on data of any sort whatever? Of course not.

In such cases facts and figures did not interest him. If Stalin said anything, it meant it was so—after all, he was a “genius” and a genius does not need to count, he only needs to look and can immediately tell how it should be. When he expresses his opinion, everyone has to repeat it and to admire his wisdom.

But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal to raise the agricultural tax by 40 billion rubles? None, absolutely none, because the proposal was not based on an actual assessment of the situation but on the fantastic ideas of a person divorced from reality. We are currently beginning slowly to work our way out of a difficult agricultural situation. The speeches of the delegates to the XXth Congress please us all; we are glad that many delegates deliver speeches, that there are conditions for the fulfillment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for animal husbandry, not during the period of five years, but within two to three years. We are certain that the commitments of the new five-year plan will be accomplished successfully. (Prolonged applause.)

Comrades!

If we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the Party and the country for 30 years and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet State, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the Party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society.

The Socialist revolution was attained by the working class and by the poor peasants with the partial support of middleclass peasants. It was attained by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party.

Lenin's great service consisted of the fact that he created a militant Party of the working class, but he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social development and with the science of proletarian victory in the fight with capitalism, and he steered this Party in the crucible of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people. During this fight the Party consistently defended the interests of the people, became its experienced leader, and led the working masses to power, to the creation of the first Socialist State.

You remember well the wise words of Lenin that the Soviet State is strong because of the awareness of the masses that history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.

Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the Party, to the many provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the Party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual.

If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as Leninists, then we have to state unequivocally that the leadership practice which came into being during the last years of Stalin's life became a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development.

Stalin often failed for months to take up some unusually important problems concerning the life of the Party and of the State whose solution could not be postponed. During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened, because one-man decisions could cause and often did cause great complications.

In the last years, when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favorably all this acted upon the development of economy and of culture.

(Applause.)

Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?

First of all we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one

of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and Party work.

It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of Leninist theory and against those who deviated. Beginning with Leninist theory, the Party, with its Central Committee at the head, started on a great scale the work of Socialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectivization and the cultural revolution. At that time Stalin gained great popularity, sympathy and support. The Party had to fight those who attempted to lead the country away from the correct Leninist path; it had to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites and rightists, and the bourgeois nationalists. This fight was indispensable. Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent Party and government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. As we have already shown, Stalin thus handled such eminent Party and government leaders as Kossior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and many others.

Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This characterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev.

In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"

Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act and consequently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and branding without any reason as a "people's enemy."

In the situation which then prevailed I have talked often with Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin; once when we two were traveling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next, home or to jail."

It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also consider the fact that in the last years the Central Committee Plenary sessions were not convened and that the sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of the Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper procedure, against serious errors and shortcomings in the practices of leadership.

As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person or in a roundabout way, without collective discussion. The sad fate of Political Bureau member, Comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known to all. It is a characteristic thing that the decision to remove him from the Political Bureau was never discussed but was reached in a devious fashion. In the same way came the decision concerning the removal of Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.

The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau was reduced and its work was disorganized by the creation within the the Political Bureau of various commissions—the so-called “quintets,” “sextets,” “septets” and “novenaries.” Here is for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of 3 October 1946.

“Stalin's Proposal:

“1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs (“Sextet”) is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

“2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the State Commission of Economic Planning of the USSR, Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known as a Septet.”

“Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.”

What a terminology of a card player! (Laughter in the hall.) It is clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of Commissions—“quintets,” “sextets,” “septets,” and “novenaries,”—was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in reaching the most important State matters.

One of the oldest members of our Party, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right of participation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction. Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent. (Laughter in the hall.) It's true—an English agent. A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there. (Indignation in the hall.)

By unilateral decision Stalin had also separated one other man from the work of the Political Bureau—Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of willfulness.

Let us consider the first Central Committee Plenum after the XIXth Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the Plenum, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our Party were guilty of some baseless charges. It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any speeches at this Congress.

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. He often stated that Political Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.

His proposal, after the XIXth Congress concerning the selection of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium, was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.

We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of the old Political Bureau members and in this way a cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.

Comrades! In order not to repeat errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual. We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtlessly performed great services to the Party, to the working class, and to the international workers' movement.

This question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of the enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the laboring people, of the interest of the victory of Socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of the Party; of the working masses, in the name of the defense of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!

Comrades! Lenin had often stressed that modesty is an absolutely integral part of a real Bolshevik. Lenin himself was the living personification of the greatest modesty. We cannot say that we have been following this Leninist example in all respects. It is enough to point out that many towns, factories and industrial enterprises, Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes, Soviet institutions and cultural institutions have been referred to by us with a title—if I may express it so—of private property of the names of these or those government or Party leaders who were still ac-

tive and in good health. Many of us participated in the action of assigning our names to various towns, rayons, undertakings and Kolkhozes. We must correct this. (Applause.)

But this should be done calmly and slowly. The Central Committee will discuss this matter and consider it carefully in order to prevent errors and excesses. I can remember how the Ukraine learned about Kossior's arrest. The Kiev radio used to start its programs thus: "This is radio (in the name of) Kossior." When one day the programs began without naming Kossior, everyone was quite certain that something had happened to Kossior, that he probably had been arrested.

Thus, if today we begin to remove the signs everywhere and to change names, people will think, that these comrades in whose honor the given enterprises, Kolkhozes or cities are named, also met some bad fate and that they have also been arrested. (Animation in the hall.)

How is the authority and the importance of this or that leader judged? On the basis of how many towns, industrial enterprises and factories, Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes carry his name. Is it not about time that we eliminate this "private property" and "nationalize" the factories, the industrial enterprises, the Kolkhozes and the Sovkhozes? (Laughter, applause, voices: "That is right.") This will benefit our cause. After all the cult of the individual is manifested also in this way.

We should in all seriousness consider the question of the cult of the individual. We cannot let this matter get out of the Party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals. (Tumultuous applause.)

* * * *

Comrades: We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.

It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of Party leadership and the norms of Party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as

the creator of history and as the creator of all material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist Party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory of Communism.

In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economy and of other sciences, as well as in the literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our Party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the Party's Central Committee during the last years, a work characterized by minute observation in all Party organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of Party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observation of the norms of Party life described in the Statutes of our Party, and finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

Comrades!

The XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our Party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building Communism. (Tumultuous applause.) And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party. (Prolonged applause.)

We are absolutely certain that our Party, armed with the historical resolutions of the XXth Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories. (Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

Long live the victorious banner of our Party—Leninism! (Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.)

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